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of challenges: from the toppling of Qadhafi to the civil war in Syria, Israeli security, a resurgent Russia, the Balkans, and
finally, of course, Afghanistan. Thus the
first few chapters are a whirlwind of individuals, meetings, and events. Among
all this, he often pauses within chapters
to highlight some of the more important
senior military and political officials
that make up the NATO alliance.
Stavridis spends considerable time
in these early chapters setting up the
facts—stating what happened—and
then trying to balance it against why
it happened and what he learned from
it. The first part of the book, however,
feels rushed and compressed, and even
in his best efforts the balance tilts
toward more numbers and facts and
away from a deep exploration of the
why. If there was one weakness, this is
it. You are left wanting more discussion on how the policy was shaped
in Washington and in Brussels. What
was the dialogue during these many
meetings? And why was it persuasive?
The second part of the book shines.
Here he discusses leadership, strategic
planning, innovation, and strategic
communication. All of these chapters
are excellent and well worth the price of
the book. In one chapter, Stavridis talks
about the actions that led to Generals
McChrystal’s and Petraeus’s resignations—and his own stumbles. It is here
he almost passes the George Orwell test.
Orwell once said, “Autobiography is only
to be trusted when it reveals something
disgraceful. A man who gives a good
account of himself is probably lying,
since any life when viewed from the
inside is simply a series of defeats.” And
for Stravridis it is not all good. Stavridis
explains that he was nominated to be
the Chief of Naval Operations, following
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what was, by many accounts, a successful tour as the supreme allied commander. This was not to be. He describes,
plainly, that some of his official travel
was not properly paid for, and a single
trip was deemed questionable by the
inspector general. He accepted responsibility for his and his staff ’s mistakes,
and made reparations. Although he was
cleared by the Secretary of the Navy
from any wrongdoing, the long investigation was enough to complicate the
political winds that are Washington, and
the Secretary of Defense had to remove
his nomination. While certainly not rising to Orwell’s definition of disgraceful,
nonetheless, it was not his shining hour.
For this reader, the stories of his days
commanding USS Barry, beautifully
captured in his book Destroyer Captain,
remain my favorite. Its style, written in
a journalist’s hand, is intimate and moving—a man that loves the sea yet knows
he is human and only can go as far as his
crew takes him. Still, his new memoir
is a refreshing dose of honesty, intelligence, and reflection—much needed
in today’s Navy and tomorrow’s leaders.
CHRISTOPHER NELSON

Winklareth, Robert J. The Battle of the Denmark
Strait: A Critical Analysis of the Bismarck’s Singular Triumph. Havertown, Pa.: Casemate Publishers, 2012. 336pp. $32.95

From Johnny Horton’s 1960 ballad
“Sink the Bismarck” to James Cameron’s
Expedition Bismarck for the Discovery
Channel in 2002, the sole sortie of the
German battleship in May 1941 has
held the attention of both the general
public and naval historians. The latter
mainly concentrate on the destruction of
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Bismarck on 27 May after a lucky aerial
torpedo hit disabled the ship’s steering
mechanism. Not so Robert Winklareth.
His focus instead is on Bismarck’s “singular triumph” in destroying the British
battle cruiser Hood three days earlier.
A 38 cm shell from its fifth salvo sliced
through Hood’s armored side below
the aft turrets, setting off first the 4 in.
secondary armament magazine and
then the main 15 in. magazine. Only 3
of its complement of 1,421 survived.
So, what is new? Winklareth, a military weapons systems expert, traces all
action at sea in five-second intervals.
He primarily uses translated German
records of the battle of the Denmark
Strait to offer a salvo-by-salvo analysis,
to re-create the speed and headings of
the major combatants, and to determine
the precise firing angles and effects of
the heavy guns. Unsurprisingly, the book
is highly detailed and a feast mainly for
naval engineering and gunnery enthusiasts. It is complemented by countless charts, diagrams, photographs,
and pencil drawings (by the author).
Winklareth’s own battle is with the
(unnamed) historians who claim that
just before the engagement with Hood,
Bismarck, in a mere six minutes, came
up the port side of the heavy cruiser
Prinz Eugen, crossed its wake to its
starboard side, and then recrossed the
cruiser’s wake to take up position on its
port side again (15–16, 258). What he
calls a “reversed photo” error resulted
in this assumption. Few will cross
swords with the author on this matter.
On the other hand, serious historians
of the battle will take umbrage at two
of Winklareth’s strong statements, both
on the first page (11) of the book. His
claim that the battle of the Denmark
Strait “was undoubtedly one of the most
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famous and most important naval battles
of World War II” will raise the hackles
especially of historians of the U.S. Navy
in the Pacific 1941–45. And his second claim, that the encounter between
Bismarck and Hood “is perhaps the most
documented event in naval history,”
will come as news to German naval
historians who are all too aware of the
fact that Bismarck’s war diary (Kriegs
tagebuch) went down with the ship.
With regard to the broader aspects of the
battle of the Denmark Strait, Winklareth
spends a great deal of time sketching
out the past histories of the German and
British navies as well as the major ship
designs of the two powers. The actual artillery duel between the German
battleship and the British battle cruiser,
in fact, consumes but half a dozen pages
of chapter 13. Unfortunately, there is
no attempt to place “Operation Rhein
übung,” the German sortie into the
Atlantic, into the wider context of Grand
Admiral Erich Raeder’s double-pole
strategy of attacking Britain’s maritime
commerce with two modern battle
fleets in the Atlantic Ocean, while a
third fleet of elderly battleships tied
the Royal Navy down in the North Sea.
The reader deserved this analysis.
HOLGER H. HERWIG

Untermeyer, Chase. Inside Reagan’s Navy: The
Pentagon Journals. College Station: Texas A&M
Univ. Press, 2015. 352pp. $25

The Washington diary is something of a
lost art these days. Instead, we have to be
satisfied with books of instant journalism using largely anonymous sources or
memoirs too often tendentiously crafted
after the fact. Chase Untermeyer is a
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